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ANTITRUST: MARKET DEFINITION, THE SECTION 2
OFFENSES AND LITERALISM
MARK

R.

LEE*

Four major antitrust disputes reached the Seventh Circuit during
the 1979-80 term. They raised difficult questions relating to market
definition and section 2 offenses. The court resolved the disputes, of
course, but it fundamentally failed to come to grips with the difficult
questions they raised. It had the power to do the former, but lacked the
clear conception of the antitrust laws needed to do the latter.
DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET:

UNITED STATES V HOUSEHOLD FINANCE CORP.

In late 1978, Household Finance Corporation,' the nation's largest
independent consumer finance company, agreed to acquire one of its
lesser rivals, the American Investment Company. 2 Shortly thereafter,
the Department of Justice filed suit to enjoin the merger as violative of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. 3 The government claimed that the relevant product market ("line of commerce" in section 7 terms) in which
to gauge the effects of the merger was the making of direct cash loans
by finance companies in various cities in which both HFC and AIC did
business. 4 It further claimed that the likely effect of the merger, so
gauged, would be to substantially reduce competition. 5 HFC challenged only the first claim. The parties stipulated that if the court were
persuaded to adopt the Government's definition of the market, the
merger was to be enjoined; if the court were persuaded to reject the
6
Government's definition, the suit was to be dismissed.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University Law School. The author gratefully acknowledges the thorough editing of Elaine D. Edelman. Portions of the article may still
lack clarity, but that is due solely to the author's stubborn refusal to follow her advice.
I. Hereinafter referred to as HFC.
2. Hereinafter referred to as AIC.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 provides, in pertinent part:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire... the stock... of another corporation ... where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
4. Complaint, Appendix on Appeal at 14, United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d
1255 (7th Cit. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
5. Id.
6. Stipulation, Appendix on Appeal at 29-30, United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602
F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
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At trial the Government's efforts were directed at establishing the
existence of a group of credit applicants, sharing particular financial
characteristics, who would be accepted by finance companies but rejected, as too risky, by credit unions, 7 commercial banks, savings and
loan associations and major credit-granting retailers. 8 The Government apparently presumed that this group of higher-risk applicants was
accepted by finance companies because the companies were permitted
to charge and, in fact, did charge higher interest rates than the other
suppliers of consumer credit. 9 By virtue of the existence of this group,
argued the government, finance companies were insulated from what
would otherwise have been their competition. The selling of consumer
credit, it contended, was "risk segmented." Therefore, the Government
concluded, direct cash loans by finance companies constituted the relevant product market.
The trial judge, Frank J. McGarr, was not persuaded.' 0 He found
that the interest rates and credit practices of consumer finance companies were sharply constrained by the need to compete with other suppliers of consumer credit." l They were particularly constrained by
credit unions, which had expanded their membership dramatically in
the preceding decade,' 2 and commercial banks, which were offering
borrowers credit cards and overdraft privileges on checking accounts as
well as conventional loans.' 3 He perceived no significant risk segmentation. 14 Indeed, Judge McGarr seemed to think that finance companies were not so much insulated from the competition as they were
succumbing to it. ' 5 The relevant product market, he concluded, was
7. The Government also contended that many higher-risk credit applicants were ineligible
for credit union membership. Brief for Appellant at 18, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980). The Government's contention
was based on the fact that only 50% of the adult population of the United States belonged to credit
unions. From this fact the Government inferred, erroneously, that 50% of all consumer credit
customers-including, presumably, many higher-risk credit applicants-lack access to a credit
union. The Government erred by assuming that all adults were consumer credit customers. It
also erred by assuming that those who were not credit union members were ineligible for membership.
8. Complaint, Appendix on Appeal at 10-1l, United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602
F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
9. Id. The higher rates, in the Government's view, permitted the finance companies to bear
the higher costs of loaning money to higher-risk credit applicants.
10. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1-19, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
No. 79 C 80 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1979).
11. Id. at 4-5, 7-8, 10-14, 16.
12. Id. at 10-1I.
13. Id. at 10.
14. Id. at 13-14.
15. Id. at 7-8.
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consumer installment credit. ,6 Accordingly, he dismissed the suit with
prejudice in accordance with the parties' stipulation.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. 17 After studying the Government's
rather weak evidence,' 8 the court was somehow persuaded of the existence of the group of higher-risk credit applicants.' 9 It did not pause
over the trial judge's findings, which it considered largely correct, 20 but
16. Id. at 16-17.
17. 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
18. To prove its contention that there existed a group of higher-risk credit customers served
only by finance companies, the Government introduced studies which purportedly showed (I) that
20% to 50% of all finance company customers were ineligible for commercial bank loans; (2) that
finance companies experienced higher delinquency and charge-off rates than commercial banks;
and (3) that finance company borrowers had a lower average income and were more likely to hold
blue-collar jobs than commercial bank borrowers. 602 F.2d at 1263-65.
These studies had limited probative value. The eligibility studies could not support strong
inferences about all finance company customers because they were based on non-representative
surveys. For example, one of them was based on a survey of the customers at a one-office finance
company located in rural Pennsylvania which had loans outstanding in the amount of only $1
million. Id. at 1264; Appellant's Supp. Appendix 4a (testimony of William Whitesell), United
States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
The studies of comparative delinquency and charge-off rates did little to bolster the Government's case since the Government failed to show that the rate differences they revealed were (a)
statistically significant and (b) explainable only in terms of the existence of a group of higher-risk
credit customers served only by finance companies. See generally Finkelstein, Regression Models
in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442 (1973). (The exercise of differing judgments
by commercial bank and finance company loan officers, influenced no doubt by different regulatory environments, for example, could have produced the rate differences.) Moreover, these studies generated data inconsistent with that generated by studies performed by the defendants. The
defendants' studies showed, that finance companies experienced identical delinquency rates and
marginally higher charge-off rates than did commercial banks. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit I1, n.I, United States v. Household
Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
The demographic studies of borrower income and job characteristics did not advance the
Government's position at all since the Government did not show, and probably could not have
shown, that such characteristics were related to risk. A relatively high-income executive who has
purchased substantial commodity futures on a margin account could represent a greater loan risk
than a relatively low-income assembly line worker who holds significant equity in his house and is
otherwise free of debt. Besides, the studies showed that commercial banks served more total customers in every income and job group than did finance companies. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 30, United States v. Household Fin.
Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
Even if all the studies introduced by the Government were granted more weight than they
deserved, they would tend to show merely that there existed a group of higher-risk credit customers served by finance companies who could not obtain ordinary commercial bank loans. That
group of customers might have been able to obtain credit from commercial banks, through overdraft privileges on checking accounts or bank credit cards, or from credit unions, savings and loan
associations, and major credit-granting retailers. The Government thus failed to prove its contention, but the Seventh Circuit accepted it anyway.
19. 602 F.2d at 1265.
20. id. at 1260. The only two findings which the Seventh Circuit deemed unsupported were
(I) "that a significant percentage of finance company customers are eligible for or actually have
non-mortgage loans at banks" and (2) "that a majority of the customers of consumer finance
companies have bank credit cards." Id. at 1263. As to the first finding, the court was clearly
wrong. See note 29 infra. As to the second finding, the court admitted that there was some supporting evidence. It was simply persuaded by the contrary evidence. 602 F.2d at 1263. Moreover,
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essentially irrelevant. 2 ' In fact, in the court's view, those findings actually supported the proposition that such a group existed. 22 Judge McGarr erred, opined the court, by failing to appreciate the controlling
importance of that fact. 23 The mere existence of the group, held the
Seventh Circuit, proved that the relevant product market was direct
24
cash loans made by finance companies.
The court's holding was economically naive and legally unsound.
It revealed not only the Seventh Circuit's inability to grasp the concept
of the relevant market, but also the court's poor understanding of the
function of the antitrust laws since that concept and function are intimately related. Moreover, the decision practically invited the Department of Justice to pursue a merger policy far too restrictive for the wellbeing of the consuming public.
To see where the court went wrong, one must understand the concept of the relevant market in the context of antitrust litigation. Antitrust litigation is ultimately about the predicted and observed effects of
all sorts of business activities on the production and consumption decisions of others. It is only by assessing such effects that a court can
determine whether a particular business activity will, on balance, frustrate or promote the purpose of the antitrust laws. The purpose of
those laws, put simply, is to secure for the general public the benefits of
competition: the highest output and lowest prices consistent with optimal resource allocation. 25 In any given case, however, the court cannot
practically consider all the effects of the activity challenged. It must
there certainly was evidence that a majority of the customers of consumer finance companies were
eligible for bank credit cards. Defendant's Supplemental Appendix on Appeal at 11.One of the
Government's own witnesses, John Reed, then a vice-president of Citicorp, testified that he
thought about 80% of the customers of Citicorp's consumer finance subsidiary, Nationwide Finance Co., would be eligible for a VISA or MasterCharge card. Id.
21. 602 F.2d at 1260, 1263.
22. Id. at 1260-63, 1265. As the court put it, "[tihe thrust of the [trial judge's] conclusion,
thus, is that although concededly some customers are uniquely served by finance companies, the
number of such customers is insignificant." Id. at 1260. That was a misrepresentation. The trial
judge assumed, arguendo, that some customers were uniquely served by finance companies. He
did not determine whether there were many or few such customers. Their number had little significance for the purpose of defining the market. See notes 26-40 and accompanying text infra.
23. "We think, however, that whether the group of customers uniquely served by finance
companies is significant enough to constitute a line of commerce within § 7 is a legal question."
602 F.2d at 1260 n.7. "The issue, however, is not whether there is a total division between the
types of customers of banks and finance companies but whether, notwithstanding any overlap in
customer bases, finance companies service some customers unable to obtain bank credit." Id. at
1264 n.12. "Indeed, even if these customers constituted a far lesser percent [less than 15%] of the
finance company clientele, we would still find that group significant." Id. at 1265.
24. Id. at 1265.
25. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BORK]; R. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as POSNER].
See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). But see Blake &
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limit the scope of its inquiry to some manageable portion of the economy. That manageable portion is, for antitrust purposes, the relevant
market.
Defining the relevant market is critical to principled decision-making in antitrust cases. If the market is defined too narrowly or too
broadly, the effects of the challenged activity are likely to be misperceived. The defendant's capacity for doing antitrust mischief will
appear either too great or too small and a court may be misled into
preventing useful business activity or permitting the pernicious kind.
How one chooses between segments of the economy which should be
considered and those which can safely be ignored depends on the effects about which one is most concerned. The choice is, in the final
analysis, a matter of policy. The antitrust laws dictate that one be most
concerned about output restrictions coupled with price increases. The
relevant market should be defined, therefore, so that it includes all participants in the economic system who may exert a substantial check on
26
the defendant's ability to bring about just such effects.
The definition of the relevant market was all important in the trial
of United States v. Household Finance Corp. since the parties had
agreed that the outcome of the case would turn on it. Thus, the real
issue was whether institutions offering alternative sources of consumer
credit exerted a substantial check on the power of finance companies to
restrict credit and raise interest rates for the group of higher-risk credit
applicants, assuming it existed.
The trial judge apparently resolved that issue in the negative when
he found no significant risk segmentation among alternative sources of
consumer credit. 27 Substantial evidence, uncontested for the most part,
buttressed his finding. First, two studies specifically designed to test the
risk segmentation hypothesis showed that, on the basis of information
upon which credit worthiness is usually determined, it was quite difficult to predict which borrowers would become bank patrons and which
finance company customers. 2 8 Second, an analysis of the credit "scorJones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965); Blake & Jones, Toward a ThreeDimensionalAntitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965).
26. POSNER, supra note 25, at 125-30; Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.,
510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). See generally Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 and n.42 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956).
27. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 14, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
No. 79 C 80 (N.D. 111.Mar. 22, 1979).
28. 602 F.2d at 1261. One of the studies was published. See Boczar, Competition Between
Banks and Finance Companies. A Cross Section Study ofPersonalLoan Debtors, 33 J. FINANCE
245 (1978).
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ing" system of banks and finance companies revealed little difference
between the two.29 Third, evaluations of the loan applications of
would-be finance company customers demonstrated that many, if not
most, of those individuals had obtained credit or were eligible to obtain
it from other institutions. 30 Fourth, official reports about the consumer
installment credit market indicated that commercial banks, credit unions, and savings and loan associations had been expanding their share
largely at the expense of finance companies. 3' Fifth, and finally, a
comparison of banks and finance companies showed that their interest
32
rates were converging and their credit practices becoming more alike.
Unfortunately, the trial judge did not explain how these five items supported his finding that there was no significant risk segmentation. He
did not explain how they proved that institutions offering alternative
sources of consumer credit did exert a substantial check on the power
29. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 14, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
79 C 80 (N.D. 111.
Mar. 22, 1979); 602 F.2d at 1262. The credit scoring systems of HFC, Security
Pacific Bank and the VISA Division of the First National Bank of Chicago were analyzed by
comparing the actual disposition of loan applications at an HFC office with the dispositions which
would have been made at the offices of the other two institutions. Defendant's Supplemental
Appendix on Appeal at 220-30. The HFC office actually accepted 40% of the applications. The
Security Pacific Bank's office would have accepted 56% of them (including 49% of those HFC
rejected) and the VISA Division of First National Bank of Chicago's office would have accepted
35% of them.
The Seventh Circuit badly misconstrued this analysis. The court seemed to think that the
acceptance rates of Security Pacific Bank and the VISA Division of First National Bank of Chicago measured the number of loan applications they would have accepted of those already accepted by HFC. 602 F.2d at 1262.
30. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 14, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
79 C 80 (N.D. I11.
Mar. 22, 1979). For example, HFC studied the loan applications submitted by
would-be borrowers at one of its offices during a period shortly preceding the trial of this case.
Defendant's Supplemental Appendix on Appeal at 188-91, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980). Many applicants were then in
debt to other financial institutions, but the majority were not. Id. On the basis of this study, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that a majority of finance company customers could not obtain credit
from other financial institutions. 602 F.2d at 1263.
31. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5-8, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
79 C 80 (N.D. 111.
Mar. 22, 1979). The following table illustrates the trend:
Percentage of Consumer Installment Credit
Held by Various Institutions
Commercial Banks
Finance Companies
Credit Unions
Retailers
Others

1967
41.7%
30.9
11.3
14.5
1.5

Oct., 1978
49.9%
19.6
16.8
8.5
5.2

Id. at 6.
32. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 13, United States v. Household Fin. Corp.,
79 C 80 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1979).
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of finance companies to restrict credit and raise interest rates for the
group of higher-risk credit applicants.
The relevance of the supporting evidence becomes clearer if we
engage in an intellectual simulation. Suppose that the local HFC/AIC
office is the only finance company outlet in a particular metropolitan
area. Its exclusivity will be preserved for the foreseeable future by government-erected barriers to entry. No finance company, therefore,
could be in any better position to extract supracompetitive interest rates
from the customer group of which the Department of Justice made so
much in United States v. Household Finance Corp. Of course, even
such a well-situated office would not "exploit" that group unless doing
so were profitable. So let us further suppose that that group's demand
for finance company loans is elastic enough at competitive interest rates
so that "exploitation" would pay. 33 Now consider the rate setting strategies theoretically available to the profit-maximizing manager. There
are two.
The manager could attempt to charge higher-risk credit applicants
an interest rate which exceeded the rate he charged other customers by
proportionately more than the difference in the costs of servicing the
two groups. 34 The problem with this "discrimination strategy" lies in
the discriminating. The manager would have to identify higher-risk
credit applicants at the time they applied. The evidence of record suggests that he might not be able to do that. The results of the two studies
designed to test the risk segmentation hypothesis suggest that effective
discrimination may be impossible. It may be inferred, at least, that the
practice is far too costly to be profitable since no financial institution
apparently engages in it. No evidence was introduced to show that
banks engage in it and finance companies use the same credit scoring
"systems" as banks do. Indeed a survey of finance company offices in
St. Louis, Missouri, and Carbondale, Illinois, conducted by the author
and his brother unearthed not one finance company which sets different interest rates for customers with different risk-related characteristics.
If discrimination were not feasible, the manager could try the al33. Elasticity of demand may be defined as the percentage change in the quantity demanded
of a good or service in response to a one percent change in the price of that good or service.
Unless the group's demand for finance company loans was elastic enough at competitive interest
rates, raising the interest rate for that group would not pay since its demand would decline by
proportionately more than the rate rise.
34. If the difference in rates was proportional to the difference in costs, then the higher rate
would be no more supracompetitive than the lower. See generally Dam, The Economics and Law
of Price Discrimination.-Herein of Three Regulatory Schemes, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. I (1963).
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ternative strategy of setting a supracompetitive interest rate for all his
customers. The problem with this "exorbitant rate strategy" is that it
might not pay. Some potential customers belonging to the lower-risk
group might curtail their borrowing or, more likely, take their business
elsewhere. If enough of them did, the revenues foregone as a result of
reduced lending might exceed the revenues generated by charging each
borrower more. Whether the "exorbitant rate strategy" would pay
would depend on the elasticity of demand for finance company loans
and the size of each risk group. The evidence of record relating to
those two factors suggests that it would not pay. It is clear from the
credit experience and eligibility of finance company loan applicants
that members of the lower-risk group have alternative sources of credit
readily available to them. Judging from the steady erosion in the share
of the consumer installment credit market held by finance companies, it
appears that they have been turning to those sources with increasing
frequency. It therefore seems reasonable to infer that this group's demand for finance company loans is strongly inelastic. Moreover, the
credit experience and eligibility data indicate that the lower-risk group
is relatively large, and the market share data leaves the impression that
the group is growing. The bigger the lower-risk group and the more
inelastic its demand, the greater would be the reduction in lending associated with the "exorbitant rate strategy." The greater the reduction
in lending, of course, the less likely it is that setting a supracompetitive
interest rate for all customers would pay.
The evidence seems to show that neither "exploitation" strategy
theoretically available to our manager would work. If they would not
work for him, they would certainly not work for the manager of a
finance company less ideally situated than the one in our simulation.
Discrimination apparently would be impractical. More importantly for
the purposes of this analysis, setting an exorbitant interest rate seemingly would not pay, primarily because of the availability of alternative
sources of credit. What that demonstrates is that banks, credit unions,
savings and loan associations and major credit-granting retailers do exert a substantial check on the ability of finance companies to restrict
credit and raise interest rates for the higher-risk customer group.
As the evidence in light of the simulation therefore shows, finance
companies did belong in the same market with the other financial institutions. All of them competed. That was borne out by the convergence
35 If
of their interest rates and the similarity of their credit practices.
35. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had stated in United States v. Phila-
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any risk segmentation existed it was certainly not significant for the
purposes of section 7. As in any line of commerce, the competition
among firms was for the marginal customers, in this instance lower-risk
credit applicants. Absent discrimination, that competition protected
36
the customers with more elastic demands from "exploitation."
The Seventh Circuit ignored this entire line of analysis. In fact, it
never addressed the real issue in the case. For it, the existence of the
higher-risk group served only by finance companies marked the end
rather than beginning of the inquiry into the relevant market. 37 If the
that it did-then
group existed-and the court was clearly persuaded
38
finance companies belonged in a separate market.
This holding cannot be squared with the decisions of the Supreme
Court in leading market definition cases. For example, in United States
P. E.l du Pont de Nemours & Co. ,39 the justices found that the product
market in which to gauge the defendant's power was flexible wrapping
materials rather than cellophane, even though some wrap users such as
cigarette manufacturers used the relatively expensive cellophane almost exclusively. 40 Unmoved by such precedent the Seventh Circuit
maintained that it was simply following the "rule" that: "a financial
institution comprises a separate product market if it offers to a 'significant' number of consumers a 'cluster of products and services' that
competing financial institutions do not."' 4' This "rule," believed the
court, had been established by the Supreme Court in a series of bank
merger cases, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,42 United
States v. PhillosburgNationalBank ,43 and United States v. Connecticut
National Bank. 44 A close reading of the opinions in those cases, however, reveals that the court was mistaken; there was no such "rule." It
also reveals that the court's holding was quite erroneous.
delphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963) and in United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank,
399 U.S. 350, 361 n.4 (1970) that banks did not compete with finance companies. 602 F.2d at
1259-60. But that was factual dicta and it was based on data decades old. It should not have been
considered controlling.
36. See generally M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 283-86 (1975).
37. 602 F.2d at 1260 n.7, 1265.
38. Id. at 1265.
39. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
40. Id. at 399-401. See also United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). In
that case, which was otherwise poorly decided, the Supreme Court held that although glass and
metal containers were used exclusively for some different purposes, both were part of the same
market. Id. at 450.
41. 602 F.2d at 1258.
42. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
43. 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
44. 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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The PhiladelphiaBank case arose out of the merger of the second
and third largest commercial banks in metropolitan Philadelphia. The
Government challenged the merger under section 7 as likely to substantially reduce competition in commercial banking. In defense the
banks argued, inter alia, that the Government had exaggerated the negative impact of the merger by defining the relevant market too narrowly. The banks contended that they were locked in economic battle
with all kinds of other financial institutions, ranging from savings and
loan associations to insurance companies. Siding with the Government
on this issue, the trial judge found that commercial banks offered a
distinct cluster of products and services, including checking and trust
administration, which no other financial institutions offered. 4 5 It is useful to note that, in sharp contrast, the trial judge in United States v.
Household Finance Corp. found that finance companies offered the
same product, consumer installment credit, as did a number of other
firms, albeit under somewhat different conditions, on somewhat differ46
ent terms, and at somewhat different interest rates.
On appeal in PhiladelphiaBank the Supreme Court agreed with
the trial judge's disposition of the relevant market issue. 47 It did not,
however, announce a special rule for determining the boundaries of the
market in section 7 cases involving financial institutions. The Justices
made it quite clear that they were simply applying standard marketdefinition tests4 8 which are responsive to the need to control output restrictions coupled with price increases. 49 Thus, the finding that commercial banks offered a distinct cluster of products and services which
other financial institutions did not offer was not independently significant. It was significant only in that it indicated that other financial
institutions did not exert a substantial check on the power of commercial banks to restrict their banking activities and increase the average
price of the cluster of products and services that they offered. Commercial banks, therefore, belonged in a separate market. Recall that when
the same standard tests were applied to the facts of United States v.
45. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348, 360-63 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
46. The Seventh Circuit incorrectly perceived those differences as indicia of separate markets. It failed to appreciate that a "market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability (credit is perhaps the most interchangeable of products) for the purposes for which
they are produced--price, use and qualitiesconsidered." United States v. E,1. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) (emphasis added).
47. 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial judge's determination that § 7 was inapplicable, his definition of the geographic market, and his prediction about
the likely effects of the merger. It, therefore, reversed. Id. at 357-72.
48. Id. at 355-56.
49. See note 26 supra.
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Household Finance Corp., it became clear that finance companies did
not belong in a separate market.
Similar market definition issues were raised in the Phillipsburg
Bank and Connecticut Bank cases. Each arose out of a merger between
commercial banks that the Government challenged on the same theory
that it had successfully used in Philadelphia Bank. The banks pressed
the same "we-compete-with-other-financial-institutions" argument that
had been rejected in PhiladelphiaBank. Each contended for its own
reasons that the argument should be accepted in its case. In the Phillpsburg Bank case, the banks marshalled evidence to prove that their
operations were much more akin to those of savings and loan associations than were the operations of the banks involved in Philadelphia
Bank .5° The Supreme Court nonchalantly dismissed the evidence, 5'
drawing a withering dissent from Justice Harlan. 52 For the purpose of
this analysis, however, the opinion contained nothing of importance.
In the Connecticut Bank case, the banks pointed out that signal
changes in the regulations limiting the types of services financial institutions could offer had dramatically altered the competitive environment since Philadelphia Bank.5 3 Again, the Supreme Court was not
persuaded, although it acknowledged the changes pointed out by the
banks. The key fact, as far as the Court was concerned, was that the
banks still offered to commercial customers a distinct cluster of services
which other financial institutions did not offer.5 4 For example, under
the applicable state statute, only banks could offer checking to such
customers.5 5 Reliance on this fact, however, did not reflect a special
rule for determining whether a particular kind of financial institution
belonged in a market all by itself. Rather, it showed that the Supreme
Court was once again applying standard market-definition tests. This
fact was important because it indicated that, if banks could readily differentiate between commercial and non-commercial customers, their
power to "exploit" the commercial customers would not be limited by
other financial institutions. Obviously, differentiating between commercial and non-commercial customers, unlike differentiating between
"higher-risk" and "lower-risk" credit applicants, was not only possible,

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

399 U.S. at 380-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part & concurring in part).
Id. at 359-60.
Id. at 373-82 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part & concurring in part).
418 U.S. at 661-63.
Id. at 664.
Id. at 665, 665 n.6.
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but probably easy. It followed, therefore, that commercial banks, unlike finance companies, belonged in a separate market.
In short, the "rule" that the Seventh Circuit applied in United
States v. Household Finance Corp. was one of its own invention. Had it
carefully examined the cases which it believed established the "rule," it
would have arrived at a contrary holding.
The result of the Seventh Circuit's erroneous holding was that a
merger which should have been permitted was prevented. Even if the
parties had not stipulated that the outcome of the case would turn on
the definition of the market, the same result would probably have been
reached because of the judicial gloss given section 7 in the Philadelphia
Bank case.
In that case, the Supreme Court held:
[A] [horizontal] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant
increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in
the absence of evidence clearly showing
that the merger is not likely
56
to have such anticompetitive effects.
What that means in practice is easy to discern. If, in a section 7 case,
the Government persuades the trial judge to define the market narrowly enough, the emerged firm and the resulting increase in concentration will appear sizeable. The merger will then almost surely be
enjoined because the defendants will probably be unable to rebut the
PhiladelphiaBank presumption. They will probably be unable to do so
because it is so difficult to prove what the effects of a horizontal merger
57
are likely to be.
The reason that this is so difficult to prove is that horizontal mergers may have so many effects. Horizontal mergers always reduce the
number of competitors in a market by one. That reduction may make
it somewhat easier for the remaining firms to collude, expressly or tacitly, to restrict output and raise prices. That danger is the one at which
section 7 is directed. 8 If that were the only effect of horizontal mergers, all of them would be illegal. But horizontal mergers may have the
opposite effect. Emerging firms may be more efficient, effective competitors than their corporate predecessors by virtue of either economies
of scale or superior management. Finally, to add to the complexity,
56. 374 U.S. at 363.
57. It is difficult, but not impossible. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974); United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
58. POSNER, supra note 25, at 96-97.
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horizontal mergers may have no net effect on consumer welfare.
Rather, their principal effect may be on the balance sheet of those who
promoted them or on the tax returns of the acquired firm's shareholders.
Since it is arduous work to persuade the trier of fact which effects
are likely to predominate, the outcome in any particular case will depend largely on which side bears the burden of doing so. That burden
normally rests with the Government. Philadelphia Bank, however,
places that burden on the defendants once the Government makes a
statistical showing regarding the size of the emerged firm and the resulting increase in concentration. The narrower the market definition
the easier it is for government lawyers to make that statistical showing
and win their cases.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Household Finance Corp. will make it far easier for government lawyers to secure
improperly narrow market definitions. It will therefore encourage
them to pursue an overly restrictive merger policy. That policy will
deter or undo mergers likely to promote consumer welfare. The irony,
unfortunately, is manifest.
SECTION

2

OFFENSES:

THE REQUISITE CONDUCT AND "INTENT"

A monopolist, as any first-semester economics student can tell you,
will find it profitable to raise his price above and restrict his output
below levels that would prevail in his industry if it were competitively
structured. 59 The impact of this strategy on the welfare of consumers is
all too predictable. Consider the high price first. Some consumers will
balk at the monopolist's price and do without his product even though
they would be quite willing to pay a price equal to, or even somewhat
in excess of, the marginal cost of meeting their demand. 60 Now consider the restriction of output, the impact of which will be less direct
but probably more significant. Since the monopolist will be producing
less, he will need fewer resources. The unneeded resources will either
lie idle or they will be employed in another industry to produce a good
or service of less marginal value to consumers than that which the monopolist might have produced. 6 1 In either event, they will yield less
total satisfaction than they otherwise would, much to the detriment of
59. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 13-

19 (1970).
60. BORK, supra note 25, at 98-101.
61. Id. "Value" refers to what consumers are willing to pay. Id.
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the consuming public. This inefficiency in allocation is one of the evils
62
against which section 2 of the Sherman Act is directed.
Yet courts have been reluctant to interpret section 2 as prohibiting
"monopoly in the concrete." 63 That reluctance has been based in part,
no doubt, on the language of the statute, which speaks of "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize," 64 and its legislative history.65 Primarily, however, courts have been reluctant to
interpret section 2 as prohibiting "monopoly in the concrete" because
they have recognized that such an interpretation would have the perverse effect of discouraging efficiency in production. 66 A relatively
large, successful firm would have to avoid producing too efficiently lest
it grow and thereby transgress section 2. The resulting injury to the
consuming public could be just as great as that caused by a monopolist's pricing/output strategy.
In response to this conundrum, courts have interpreted section 2 as
condemning only those monopolists and would-be monopolists who
behave "badly."' 67 Distinguishing "bad" business behavior from
"good," unfortunately, has proved no simple task. Even the most
learned judges, like Hand and Wyzanski, have stumbled. 68 The
Supreme Court's hackneyed formulations, like "the willful acquisition
or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or
development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident," 69 have provided little guidance. 70 Nor has characterizing the defendant's "specific intent," generally said to be a sepa62. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977). But see
Blake & Jones, In Defense ofAntitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1965); Blake & Jones, Toward a
Three-DimensionalAntitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965).
63. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
65. See Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 7
(1966).
66. 603 F.2d at 273; In re E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., F.T.C. No. 9108, ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987 (Oct. 30, 1980) F-I, F-9, F-I 1; United States v. Aluminium Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). See BORK, supra note 25, at 90-106.
67. 603 F.2d at 273-76; Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894,
919 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
68. See BORK, supra note 25, at 164-75; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953) (Wyzanski, J.), afdper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
69. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
70. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D.
Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); In re E.I. duPont
de Nemours & Co., F.T.C. No. 9108, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987 (Oct. 30,
1980) F-I, F-7.
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rate element of attempting to monopolize, 7 1 proved particularly helpful
in evaluating business behavior. It has not been helpful for three reasons. First, evaluating a defendant's business behavior on the basis of
his "specific intent" involves blatant bootstrapping because the latter is
almost always inferred from the former. Second, the metaphysics of
ascribing a state of mind to a corporation is problematic. 72 Third, and
most importantly, it is not at all clear what a defendant might "specifically intend" to do that should be considered wrongful. After all, every
competitively energetic firm intends to prevail over its actual or poten73
tial rivals.
Perhaps these analytical difficulties were inevitable. By focusing
on conduct and, to some extent "specific intent," judges have not so
much solved the section 2 conundrum as they have recast it in the language of traditional Anglo-American jurisprudence. They must still be
concerned about economics. Indeed, no principled judge could determine what a firm may or may not do under section 2, without reference
to the effects of its conduct on allocative and productive efficiency.
That is why Professor Bork has argued that "bad" business behavior be
defined as behavior which could not be profit-maximizing unless the
firm engaging in it expected that by doing so it would (1) drive its rivals
from the market, leaving it with a share sufficient to command monopoly profits or (2) chasten its rivals into abandoning their competitive
74
behavior.
In any event, when a court classifies particular business behavior
as "bad" or "predatory," it reveals the extent of its understanding of
the purpose of section 2. That is exactly what the Seventh Circuit did
in Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp.,75 City of
Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co.,76 and Photovest Corp. v.
Fotomat Corp .77 Let us consider them seriatim.
71. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization:
A Mildly ExpansionaryAnswer to the ProphylacticRiddle of Section Two, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 373
(1974).
72. See generally State v. Adjustment Dept. Credit Bureau, Inc., 94 Ida. 156, 483 P.2d 687
(1971); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 914 (1972); Model Penal Code § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
73. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW 76 (1978) (hereinafter cited as AREEDA &
TURNER]. See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925-26 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
74. BORK, supra note 25, at 144. Complaint counsel in In re E.1. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
apparently adopted Professor Bork's definition. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 987
(Oct. 30, 1980) F-I, F-5.
75. 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980).
76. 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1278 (1980).
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Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp.:
"Predatory Pricing"
For some time prior to spring, 1973, Martin Marietta Corporation
had encountered little competition in the Chillicothe, Illinois, market
for "CA-6," a coarse, unwashed gravel used primarily in the construction of roads, parking lots and driveways. 78 It was then that the Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Company ("CS&G") opened for business.
During the first two years of its existence, CS&G captured an evergrowing share of the market by underpricing Martin Marietta. When
Martin Marietta finally responded, the two firms entered into a prolonged price-cutting war which did not end until early 1977. The fol79
lowing table illustrates the ebb and flow of the battle:
SALES IN TONS
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

MM
196,600
132,400
132,100
201,900
196,400
331,700

CS&G
48,365
83,980
110,449
188,259
132,329
56,143

SALES IN DOLLARS
MM
$311,700
248,300
241,700
337,200
316,200
593,700

CS&G
$ 72,342
138,266
206,391
323,522
202,455
110,405

AVG. PRICE
MM
$1.59
1.88
1.83
1.67
1.61
1.79

CS&G
$1.50
1.65
1.87
1.72
1.53
1.97

Clearly, Martin Marietta emerged the victor.
Nursing its financial wounds, CS&G decided to try to win in the
courtroom what it had lost in the marketplace. Shortly after the pricecutting war ended, it filed an antitrust suit against its chief rival, claiming, inter alia, that Martin Marietta had monopolized or attempted to
monopolize the local CA-6 market by selling CA-6 at unreasonably
80
low prices.
Price-cutting itself, of course, is hardly predatory. Indeed, it is the
quintessence of competition: a firm finds itself underpriced, it responds
with a price reduction, and its rivals respond in kind. In a market
populated by many buyers and sellers, this process will tend to keep
price hovering around marginal cost. Marginal cost pricing is usually
considered desirable from an antitrust point of view. It practically
guarantees that every consumer willing to pay the cost of meeting his
78. 615 F.2d at 429 & n.l.
79. Id. at 430 n.3.
80. CS&G also complained that Martin Marietta had (1) underpriced CS&G on several occasions only after it was advised of CS&G's price; (2) quoted prices for CA-6 and other products
on the understanding that the prices were firm only if a contractor's requirements for both were
purchased from it; and (3) disparaged CS&G's product. The court treated these complaints as
part of the section 2 claim, but found them meritless. 615 F.2d at 433.
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demand will be supplied and that resources will be put to their most
effective use. 8' Since the antitrust laws are designed to secure just such
benefits, it would seem anomalous to hold that they generally forbid a
firm from lowering its price.
Cutting price below marginal cost, however, would be suspect because it would turn every sale into a loss. Aside from promotional ef-

fects, a firm could not hope to maximize profits by engaging in such a
practice unless it expected that by doing so it would (1) drive its rivals
from the market, leaving it with a share of the market sufficient to command monopoly profits or (2) chasten its rivals into abandoning their
competitive behavior. In Bork's terms, cutting price below marginal
82
cost, at least for long periods, seems predatory.
Professors Areeda and Turner have suggested, in fact, that predatory pricing be defined as cutting price below short-run marginal cost,
or its accounting surrogate, average variable costs. 83 Their suggestion
has been heeded by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, 84 but it has been roundly criticized by other
academicians, particularly Professors Posner and Williamson.8 5 Posner
contended that Areeda and Turner mistakenly emphasized the shortrun perspective and ignored the importance of "intent." 86 He has suggested that predatory pricing be defined as cutting price below long-run
marginal cost, or its accounting surrogate, average total cost, with the
"intent" to exclude.8 7 Williamson took Areeda and Turner to task for
failing to account for the possible untoward effects of a dominant firm's
strategic behavior. 88 He argued that cutting price by a dominant firm
81. BORK, supra note 25, at 92-98.
82. Id. at 144. Bork himself, however, would prefer that there be no rule against predatory
pricing. Id. at 155. He reasons that the benefits of a rule would be small since firms are unlikely
to engage in the practice, and the costs of a rule would be large since courts are likely to mistake
competitive pricing for predatory pricing. Id.
83. Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricing and RelatedPracticesunder Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975).
84. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 829 (1978); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. of Nevada v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co.,
517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
85. POSNER, supra note 25, at 184-96; Williamson, PredatoryPricing.-A Strategicand Welfare
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Williamson, Williamson on PredatoryPricing II, 88 YALE L.J.
1183 (1979). See also Scherer, PredatoryPricingand the Sherman Act. A Comment, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on PredatoryPricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976).
86. POSNER, supra note 25, at 190-93.
87. Id. at 190. It is clear that Posner sees average total cost as a reasonable accounting surrogate for long-run marginal cost only under limited conditions-"where demand and cost are stable over reasonably long periods of time." 1d.
88. Williamson, Predatory Pricing- A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284
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should be deemed predatory, even if not below short-run or long-run
marginal cost, when it accompanies a temporary, preemptive expansion
89
in output designed to forestall entry into the market.
The trial judge in Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta
Corp. did not have to enter the debate because the plaintiff failed to
introduce any evidence indicating that the defendant had engaged in
predatory pricing, however defined. CS&G did not contest the fact that
Martin Marietta had never sold CA-6 at prices below its average variable cost. 90 CS&G did offer evidence to show that Martin Marietta had
made a few sales at prices below its average total cost but that evidence
was rejected on procedural grounds and, in any event, would have
shown that Martin Marietta had made many more sales at prices above
its average total cost.9 1 CS&G did not even address the possibility of a
temporary preemptive expansion in output and, as the table readily
reveals, Martin Marietta contracted its output following CS&G's entry
into the market. Accordingly, when 92CS&G rested, the trial judge directed a verdict for Martin Marietta.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 93 Declaring that Martin
Marietta's conduct had to be considered "in light of its effects on the
proper functioning of a competitive market. . . -94 the court found it
perfectly legal. The court did not permit itself to become sidetracked
by characterizations of the defendant's "intent," although it was plain
that Martin Marietta's management was unhappy about CS&G's entry95 into the market and had the fixed purpose of defeating CS&G in
the price cutting war. The court's opinion was not very enlightening.
(1977); Williamson, Williamson on PredatoryPricing II, 88 .YALE L.J. 1183 (1979). Areeda and
Turner defended themselves and counterattacked in Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE
L.J. 1337 (1978) and PredatoryPricing.- A Rejoinder, 88 YALE L.J. 1641 (1979).

89. Williamson, Predatory Pricing.- A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 33337. Williamson's principal proposed rules are:
I. Lawful Behavior
1.1 Short Run: . . .When dominant firms reduce their output or hold their (demand adjusted) output unchanged in the face of new entry they shall be deemed to be
behaving in a nonpredatory way provided that the resulting market price is not less than
average variable cost. ...
Unlawful Behavior
2.1 Short Run: . . .Dominant firms that expand their (demand adjusted) output
in the face of new entry will be deemed to be engaged in predatory behavior-even if the
resulting market price exceeds the dominant firm's average variable cost. ...
Id. at 333-34 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
90. 615 F.2d at 432.
91. Id. at 432 n.7.
92. Id. at 428.
93. Id. at 427.
94. Id. at 431.
95. Martin Marietta conceded that one of its executives told CS&G's principals that it
2.
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Its discussion of predatory pricing consisted of little more than a short
report on the Areeda and Turner proposal and the reception given it by
courts and scholars. 96 The court did comment favorably on the utility
of Areeda and Turner's work, 97 but it refused to adopt their approach
outright, citing reasons which suggest that the court may not have really understood it. 98 When the court turned to Martin Marietta's particular price cuts, it noted their relationship to both average variable
cost and average total cost, but it did not explain the significance of that
relationship. 99 Such vices, however, detract only slightly from the essential virtue of the opinion, the holding. The holding indicated that
the Seventh Circuit understood the consumer welfare goal of section 2.
Unfortunately the court's holdings in City of Mishawaka v. American
ElectricPower Co. and Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp. indicated just
the opposite. 100
City of Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co.:
The "Price Squeeze"
This case arose out of a difference between wholesale and retail
rates for electric power charged by the Indiana & Michigan Electric
Company ("I&M") during the period 1976-78. I&M, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of American Electric Power Company, is in the business of
generating and transmitting electric power. It sells its power to municipally-owned distribution companies for resale and directly to industrial, commercial and residential customers. All sales are made subject
to a system of dual regulation. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regulates I&M's wholesale rates and the public service commissions of Indiana and Michigan regulate its retail rates.
Differences in rate-setting techniques between the federal and state
"would not appreciate having a new competitor 'right under their [sic] doorstep,...'" Brief for
Appellee at 34.
96. 615 F.2d at 431-32.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court criticized Areeda and Turner for their "willingness to allow damage to
competition and the destruction, by one competitor, of equally efficient competitors as long as
prices remain at or above marginal costs." Id. at 432 (citation omitted). It found their reasons,
the "inability to arrive at a 'satisfactory' method of eliminating this risk and administrative ease,"
id., wanting. This suggests that the court may not have understood that Areeda and Turner were
attempting to strike a delicate balance between allocative and productive efficiency and, at the
same time, articulate a "'rule" which a court could apply.
99. Id.
100. The inconsistency in these three opinions is particularly striking given the panels that
issued them. Judge Wood was a member of all three; Judge Pell was a member of two (he was not
a member of the panel that decided City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co.).
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agencies accounted for some of the controversial difference in rates.'l0
Differences in the agencies powers and procedures, however, played a
much more significant role.
The agencies have different powers and procedures for coping with
"regulatory lag," the seemingly inevitable delay between the filing of
proposed rates and their approval or disapproval. The FERC may suspend proposed rates, but for no more than five months. 0 2 After that,
the utility may put them into effect subject to refund if they are ultimately found unjust and unreasonable. The state commissions apparently may suspend proposed rates indefinitely, subject only to
constitutional limitations on the taking of property without due process
03
of law. '
The importance of these differences in suspension powers and procedures was evident during the period 1976-78 when I&M had proposals for higher rates pending before the FERC and the state public
service commissions. I&M was permitted to put its higher proposed
wholesale rates into effect, but not its higher proposed retail rates. As a
consequence, municipally-owned distribution companies paid more
than they would have paid had each been charged the retail rates in
effect for a customer with its load characteristics.' 4 Naturally, the municipalities were unhappy. Ten of them brought an antitrust suit
against I&M claiming that it had monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market for retail electric power in its service area by creating
'0 5
this difference in rates, a difference they labelled a "price squeeze."'
The municipalities were successful at trial 0 6 and on appeal the
judgment they had obtained was, in substance, affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit. 0 7 By labelling the rate difference a "price squeeze" they effec101. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 983 (7th Cir. 1980). For
example, the state commissions required a cost of service study using an historic test year, while
the FERC required one using a prospective test year. Stipulations of Fact (Stipulations 15 & 16),
Joint Appendix on Appeal at 113-14. The studies are almost bound to reveal different costs of
service and the rates designed to reflect those costs are almost bound to be different.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976).
103. See 616 F.2d at 983; IND. CODE § 8-1-2-42 (1980 Stpp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.552
(1970).
104. Stipulations of Fact (Stipulations 41, 42, 48, 49, 51, 52 & 53), Joint Appendix on Appeal
at 122-26, 128-57; City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1324 (N.D.
Ind. 1979). The Seventh Circuit thus erred when it stated, "[blecause the utility's wholesale rates
charged the municipalities during the period 1976-1978 exceeded the retail rates charged to its
own retail customers, the utility was found by the trial court to be guilty of a 'price squeeze'.
616 F.2d at 978. (footnote omitted).
105. City of Mishawaka v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 560 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 922 (1978).
106. City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
107. 616 F.2d at 976. The court found merit in the municipalities' section 2 claim, but re-
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tively conjured up the populist image of robber barons doing dastardly
deeds to the innocents of the marketplace, but invoking pejoratives
hardly suffices as analysis. As it happens, it is not at all clear that
8
I&M's conduct was objectionable in terms of section 2.10
At the threshold, it may well be doubted that the difference in rates
which constituted the "price squeeze" had any significance at all, much
less any antitrust significance. It was, after all, the difference between
actual wholesale rates and hypothetical retail rates. The actual wholesale rates were the rates which the municipally owned distribution
companies paid. The hypothetical retail rates, the retail rates in effect
for customers with load characteristics similar to those of each company, were the rates which the municipally owned companies wished
they had paid. Wishing, of course, neither makes things so nor gives
them significance. I&M might not have been permitted to charge those
hypothetical retail rates even if it had applied to do so. To charge each
municipally-owned distribution company the retail rate in effect for a
customer with its load characteristics might well have been ruled unduly discriminatory. 0 9
Putting such doubts to one side, it still does not appear that I&M's
"price squeeze" qualified as the kind of strategic behavior which Bork
defined as predatory. Because of rate regulation, of course, it is impossible to ascertain whether I&M's conduct would have been profit maximizing regardless of its impact on the municipalities. Also because of
rate regulation, however, it seems rather unlikely that I&M hoped to
manipulate its rates to its own advantage following a successful "price
squeeze," even if a successful "price squeeze" would have driven the
municipally-owned distribution companies from the market or chastened them into abandoning some unspecified competitive behavior.
Looking beyond Bork's test, I&M's "price squeeze" could have
had an adverse impact on consumer welfare only if it had been discriminatory. If the "price squeeze" had been discriminatory, it could
versed the award of treble damages. Id. at 986-90. Damages had been assessed by multiplying
the offending rate differentials by the quantity of electric power consumed by the municipalities
during the 1976-78 period. The court objected to that method of assessment. It insisted that
municipalities "establish their antitrust damages by proof of specific injuries they have suffered as
a result of the utility's overcharges and other monopolistic practices." Id. at 989. Although the
court suggested that the municipalities would be able to do so, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowlO-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) might make their task rather difficult. See note 31 supra and
accompanying text.
108. It is also less than clear that I&M qualified as a monopolist for the purposes of this suit.
In each municipality, the municipally-owned distribution company, rather than I&M, was the
virtual monopolist.
109. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (1976).
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have distorted whatever retail competition existed between I&M and
the municipalities by making I&M's distribution networks appear less
costly than those of the municipalities' when, in fact, the opposite was
true. Consumption patterns could have shifted because of this deceptive appearance and, as a result, more resources could have been used
to distribute electric power than would have been used otherwise."l 0
The inefficiency that could be engendered by a discriminatory "price
squeeze" would justify antitrust suspicions, but not necessarily an antitrust condemnation. A discriminatory "price squeeze" could also engender efficiency. By using it, a monopolist might lower his average
price and raise his output. I"' Some of the misallocation associated with
a monopolist's pricing/output strategy could thus be avoided. To determine whether I&M's "price squeeze" would have engendered more
efficiency or inefficiency, assuming that it had been discriminatory,
would have required considerable analysis.' 12
The Seventh Circuit did not engage in that analysis because it apparently did not object to the "price squeeze" as discriminatory. Indeed, it would have been improper for it to do so since the
municipalities introduced no evidence whatsoever indicating either that
I&M's rates were discriminatory, or that, even if they were, there existed substantial retail competition between the municipally-owned distribution companies and I&M which those rates might have
distorted." 3 Unfortunately, the court did not explain just why it did
object to the "price squeeze."
The Seventh Circuit criticized the "prize squeeze" as "calculated
to force the municipalities out of the retail electric business resulting in
the conversion of the municipal retail customers into retail customers
of the utility."' "' If this criticism constituted the court's objection to the
"price squeeze," then its objection was unsound for at least three reasons. First, it is doubtful that I&M had the "intention" the court
ascribed to it. The supporting evidence was sketchy at best. The court
110. The effect would be the same had the discriminatory "price squeeze" merely caused the
apparent and actual costs of the respective distribution networks to vary.
I ll. A monopolist will always find it advantageous to reduce his price to those who would
otherwise not purchase his product or service, as long as he can readily identify that group. If he
does so, his average price will drop and his output will expand.
In an imperfect world, where it may be difficult to differentiate among potential customers,

discrimination may not always have such a desirable effect. See POSNER, .upra note 25, at 64.
112. Id.
113. Although the trial judge concluded that there was such competition, 465 F. Supp. at 132324, 1326-27, his conclusion appears to have been based on speculation rather than evidence. See
Plaintiffs' answers to Defendants' interrogatories requesting information about any competition
that might exist. Joint Appendix on Appeal at 1056-88, 1131-74, 1177-86.
114. 616 F.2d at 978.
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could only point to I&M's timely notice to the municipalities that it did
not anticipate renewing full-requirements contracts with them due to
an expected shortage in generating capacity"15 and I&M's acquisition
of four municipally-owned distribution companies between 1957 and
1966.116 The contrary evidence was overwhelming. There would have
been no "price squeeze" had all of I&M's proposed rates been approved in a timely fashion by the appropriate agencies." 17 Moreover,
I&M seemingly had no incentive to force the municipalities out and
take over their customers if it could, in fact, extract more from them
under its wholesale rates than under its retail rates.' 18
Second, even if I&M had such an "intention" it is doubtful that it
should have been considered "evil" since, in the retail market for electric power it amounted to little more than the "intention" to prevail
over one's actual or potential rivals,' '9 an "intention" which may be
ascribed, as noted earlier, to any competitively energetic firm. Third,
and finally, it is doubtful that otherwise lawful conduct should be
deemed an antitrust violation simply because it was engaged in with an
"evil intention." 120
The court also complained that in creating the "price squeeze,"
I&M had breached some putative statutory duty to consider the competitive impact of its own rates,' 2' and "abused" the administrative
115. Id. at 983. The court made much of this alleged "cut-off' threat although it was clearly
nothing of the kind. The court admitted that the "threatened cut-off" would not have constituted
a section 2 violation except in the context of the "price squeeze." Id. at 985.
116. Id. at 981. Joint Appendix on Appeal at 98. I&M also leased Fort Wayne's utility assets
in 1975. The acquisitions and the lease obviously occurred before the alleged "price squeeze" and
revealed little, if anything, about I&M's "intention" in creating it.
117. 616 F.2d at 984. The court discounted this evidence on the ground that l&M's proposed
rates did not necessarily reflect its true "intention" since it frequently proposed rates in excess of
those it expected the regulatory agency to approve. Id.
There was no evidence, however, that I&M had inflated its proposed wholesale rates any
more than its proposed retail rates. The difference between them, therefore, was surely more
indicative of I&M's "intent" than the difference upon which the court focused.
118. I&M might have been able to extract more from the municipalities' customers as a group
under its retail rates than it was able to extract from the municipalities themselves under its wholesale rates. Retail rates are complex; some retail customers pay more per average kilowatt-hour
than do others. Under its retail rates, then, I&M might have extracted more than under its uniform wholesale rates. If this possibility "motivated" I&M's "price squeeze" then the court's emphasis on the difference between wholesale rates and retail rates in effect for customers with the
load characteristics of each municipality was probably misplaced.
119. Since the retail market for electric power in any particular area is almost always served
most efficiently by one firm, it is practically inevitable that if one firm in that market prevails over
another, only the prevailing firm will remain.
120. Buffalo Courier-Express, Inc. v. Buffalo Evening News, Inc., 601 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir.
1979); In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., F.T.C. No. 9108, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.

(BNA) No. 987 (Oct. 30, 1980) F-1, F-5, F-6; AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 72, at 73-77.
121. 616 F.2d at 981-82.
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process of the FERC. 122 If the court's objection to the "price squeeze"
was based on these complaints, then it cannot withstand the slightest
scrutiny.
The simple answer to the first complaint is that I&M had no statutory duty to consider the competitive impact of its proposed rates. The
court's contrary view was based on a twisted reading of section 205(b)
of the Federal Power Act 123 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
that statute in FederalPower Commission v. Conway Corp. 124 Section
205(b) forbids public utilities from "maintainfing] any unreasonable
difference in rates . . . between classes of service" for sales subject to
FERC jurisdiction. In Conway, the question presented was whether, in
enforcing section 205(b), the FERC had jurisdiction to consider the relationship between wholesale rates awaiting its approval and retail
rates not even subject to its scrutiny. The Supreme Court held that it
did. Neither the language of the statute nor the Supreme Court's delineation of the FERC's jurisdiction even speaks to those matters which
a public utility must consider in proposing rates. 25 Moreover, the
mental process by which a utility's management fashions the rates it
will propose has nothing to do with the consumer welfare goal of section 2. Mental processes can have no impact on allocative or productive efficiency; only conduct can.
The second complaint was downright silly. It would have been
more accurate to say that I&M had been "abused" by the painful slowness of the FERC than to say, as the court did, that I&M "abused" the
administrative process of that agency. The Seventh Circuit was un122. Id. at 982-83.
123. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (1976).
124. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
125. It could be argued, unpersuasively I think, that Conway imposes a duty on utilities to
refrain from putting into effect rates which would be unduly discriminatory. There was no evidence, however, that I&M breached that duty. To prove that I&M had breached that duty, the
municipalities would have had to introduce evidence indicating that the difference between the
wholesale rates I&M put into effect and its then extant retail rates was disproportionate to the
difference in the costs of servicing its wholesale and retail customers. The only evidence relating
to costs which was introduced at trial was that which I&M had submitted to the various regulatory
agencies to justify its proposed rates.
In any event the argument that Conway imposes such a duty is unpersuasive. Section 205(e)
of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (1976), provides that a utility's proposed rates may
be suspended for no more than five months, and that after that a utility may put its proposed rates
into effect subject to refund. It seems unlikely that Congress intended § 205(b) as an amendment
to § 205(e). Yet, if the argument is accepted, § 205(b) would become just that, limiting the occasions upon which a utility could put its proposed rates, previously suspended, into effect.
Moreover, even accepting the argument and ignoring the lack of evidence, putting rates into
effect which are unduly discriminatory is not necessarily predatory. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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happy with the way I&M had responded to regulatory lag. 126 I&M had
found that its rates had been made obsolete by rising costs even before
they had been passed upon by the FERC. Therefore, it proposed new
rates which the FERC promptly suspended for five months. By the
time five months had elapsed, the FERC had not passed upon I&M's
proposed new rates. In fact, it had still not passed upon the rates they
were to have supplanted. So, I&M put its proposed new rates into effect subject, of course, to refund. By doing so, I&M violated neither the
letter nor the spirit of the FERC's procedures. In enacting the Federal
Power Act, which governs those procedures, the Congress implicitly determined that the utilities it was subjecting to regulation would not
have to suffer rising costs without rate relief for longer than five
months, the maximum period of suspension. I&M merely availed itself
of its rights. The fact that its rates were not eventually approved in
28
their entirety 27 did not show, despite the court's contrary intimation, 1
that I&M had been engaged in meritless litigation designed to forestall
entry, a practice which the Supreme Court has held might violate section 2.129 It would be preposterous to argue that every time a regulated
enterprise failed to win from an administrative agency all that it asked,
its very asking would subject it to antitrust scrutiny.
Underlying the court's criticism and complaints was its evident
concern about the effects of I&M's conduct on the welfare of the municipally-owned distribution companies. That concern was reflected in
the court's very definition of "price squeeze," "a situation where the
monopolist charges its wholesale customer a wholesale rate high
enough to impede that customer's competition with the monopolist in
the retail market."' 30 It is all too likely that the court objected to the
"price squeeze" because it put in jeopardy the continued survival of
those companies. It was for similar reasons that Hand objected to
"price squeezes" in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 13 and
United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 132 the only previously re-

ported cases in which the practice was held to run afoul of section

2.133

126. 616 F.2d at 982.
127. Id.

128. Id. at 982-83.
129. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
130. 616 F.2d at 978 n.4.
131. 148 F.2d 416, 436-38 (2d Cir. 1945).
132. 234 F. 964, 985-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).

133. It appears that Hand, who invented so many other antitrust cliches, also invented this
one. All other references to "price squeezes" as antitrust violations have been dicta.
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The Seventh Circuit has sounded this populist theme before, interpreting section 2 as if it were designed to preserve the existence of competitors for their own sake rather than for the consuming public's., 34 The
court's objection to the "price squeeze" was inconsistent with its decision in Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp. and indicated that the Seventh Circuit did not truly understand the purpose
of the prohibition against monopolizing and attempting to monopolize.
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.:
Franchisor/Franchisee Competition and
Breach of Contract
This case, like so many similar ones, germinated in the fertile antitrust soil of a franchisor/franchisee relationship. To understand this
case, one must understand that relationship, its beginnings, its contractual underpinnings, and its degeneration.
When the defendant Fotomat was incorporated in 1967, it was
idea rich and capital poor. Its idea was to retail film and film processing at drive-thru huts, called "kiosks," used exclusively for that purpose. 13 5 The key to converting that idea into a successful enterprise, in
the view of Fotomat's managers, was "blitzing the market," quickly
placing kiosks in the most desirable locations, usually shopping centers,
in metropolitan areas throughout the United States. 136 "Blitzing the
market," however, required considerable capital, which Fotomat lacked. So Fotomat's managers began to solicit potential franchisees, including a group of Indianapolis entrepreneurs who later became the
principals of the plaintiff Photovest.
In attempting to persuade the Indianapolis group to invest, Fotomat's managers made what turned out to be critical representations
about how much competition each of the group's stores would likely
encounter from other Fotomat stores. 13 7 Fotomat's managers stated
that they would refrain, as a general rule, from franchising or operating
a store within a two-mile radius of an existing one. It would be from
that area, they predicted, that each Fotomat store would draw most of
its customers. 38 The group could expect the rule to be observed, they
134. See Lee, Antitrust: A Collage of Vertical Territorial Restraints, Tying and Monopoly "Misuse," Arbitrability, and the General Dynamics Defense, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1979).
135. 606 F.2d at 707.
136. Id. at 715.
137. Id. at 716.
138. Id. Fotomat's managers called this circle around each store the "market area." Their
prediction that each store's customers would come primarily from its market area was purportedly
based on demographic studies. Id.
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claimed, because doing so would not only be honorable but, under the
franchise contract, would also be good business for Fotomat. The
franchise contract provided that Fotomat would derive a substantial
portion of its franchising income from "royalty" payments of 12 percent of each store's gross revenues in excess of $2500. If stores were
placed too close to one another, they explained, each store's gross revenues would decline and thus so would its "royalty" payments to Fotomat.

139

The solicitation of the Indianapolis group was quite successful.
Indeed, the franchisor/franchisee relationship began auspiciously as
Fotomat's managers persuaded the group, now Photovest, to acquire
all fifteen franchises then planned for the Indianapolis area.' 40 Thus,
when Photovest opened its first stores in 1968, it alone sold film and
film processing at kiosks. Defining the relevant market as selling film
4
and film processing at kiosks, as the Seventh Circuit erroneously did,' '
Photovest would have qualified as a monopolist.
Fotomat and Photovest, of course, memorialized their complex relationship in a contract, 142 the provisions of which loomed large in this
case. For its part, Fotomat promised (1) to permit the use of its trademark; (2) to lease sites for the kiosks; (3) to supply kiosks, other minor
equipment and an inventory of products; (4) to pick up film deposited
by customers and deliver film processed for customers on a daily basis;
(5) to sell film and film processing at its own cost; and (6) to give
Photovest the option of purchasing any additional stores placed in the
Indianapolis area. In return, Photovest promised to pay (1) $21,000 up
front; (2) $375 per month rent for five years and more thereafter
prusuant to a cost index formula; (3) "royalties" as previously mentioned; (4) 3 percent of gross sales (earmarked for advertising, public
relations, and promotions); and (5) the wholesale price of all film and
film processing which were to be purchased exclusively through Fotomat. 143
Neither the relationship nor the contract survived the apparent
greed of Fotomat's managers. They soon realized that Fotomat could
139. Id.
140. Id.

141. Apparently, the court defined the market as it did primarily because Fotomat's photo
processing prices were 20% higher than those quoted by more conventional retailers. Id. at 713.
In so doing, the court committed the same error it committed in United States v. Household
Finance. See text accompanying notes 1-13 supra.
142. Actually, a separate contract was signed for each of the fifteen franchises. The essential
provisions of each, however, were nearly identical. 606 F.2d at 707.
143.

Id. at 716-17.
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do better financially by opening its own stores and selling directly to
the consuming public than it could by franchising. 144 In June, 1974,
Fotomat opened a store a scant one and one-half miles from one of
Photovest's. To eliminate the resulting rivalry, Photovest exercised its
option to buy the store, 145 but Fotomat's managers persisted. They
opened two more Indianapolis stores in the fall of 1974 and eight more
thereafter. All were within close proximity of Photovest's most profitable ones. Photovest decided not to exercise its option to buy because it
found that the price at which Fotomat offered to sell each store was too
high, so it simply suffered the competition.' 46 Needless to say, the
franchisor/franchisee relationship was strained.
Meanwhile, Fotomat's managers had figured out that Fotomat had
not been extracting from its franchisees nearly as much as it could on
sales of film and film processing. To extract more it had only to mark
up its film prices above cost and retain some of the secret discounts it
had obtained from the film processors with which it did business. The
fact that both practices were expressly forbidden by the franchise contract 47 did not deter Fotomat's managers.
They showed the same lack of concern for contractual niceties
when, in the summer of 1974, Photovest decided to switch processors
48
for print film because of customer dissatisfaction with print quality. 1
Three years before, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 149 Fotomat had released Photovest from its obligation to purchase film processing exclusively through Fotomat. So in
deciding to switch processors for print film, Photovest was well within
its rights. Fotomat's managers, however, were loathe to honor
Photovest's decision because of the additional costs Fotomat would
have to bear as a result of the switch, additional costs associated with
the transportation of print and slide film to and from separate processors. Therefore, they responded to Photovest's decision by announcing
that, despite the franchise contract, it would also have to switch proces144. Id. at 715. Apparently, Fotomat found it profitable to open stores near those with gross
sales in excess of $70,000 yearly. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., [1977-1] TRADE CASES
(CCH) 61,529 at 72,085 (S.D. Ind. 1977).
145. 606 F.2d at 717. Photovest was clearly trying to forestall entry. Perhaps Fotomat would
have fared better had it attacked this conduct and "intent" as violative of section 2.
146. Id. The court perceived this development as more sinister: "Fotomat announced that the
price for a franchise store was now $30,000 and the required monthly rental would be $500 per
month. It was not economically feasible for Photovest to accept new stores on those terms, a fact
which was known to Fotomat." Id.
147. Id. at 719-20.
148. Id. at 720.
149. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
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sors for slide film and perform its own pick-up and delivery. 150
All of these actions, of course, enriched Fotomat at the expense of
Photovest, and so did the decision to raise the rent for each store site.
In late 1974 Photovest filed suit, claiming, inter alia, that Fotomat
had attempted to monopolize the Indianapolis market for selling film
and film processing at kiosks by opening stores, breaching the franchise
contract, and even by raising the rent for each store site.' 5 ' At a bench
trial, Photovest obtained a judgment for treble damages. 5532 Fotomat
appealed, but the Seventh Circuit, in substance, affirmed.
The Seventh Circuit's decision was, in the tradition of United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 4 and United States v. Von's Grocery
Co.,' 5 5 a splendid contribution to antitrust's theater of the absurd. It
deserves acclaim from all the Albees and Becketts of the bench and bar.
What the court did, essentially, was condemn Fotomat for vigorously
penetrating a market which, as the court defined it, was dominated by a
virtual monopolist, Photovest. Such conduct should have been sacrosanct under section 2.156 After all, it alone can restore competitive
150. 606 F.2d at 720. The court labelled this anticipatory breach of the franchise contract a
"tie." Id. Indeed, the court held that Fotomat had transgressed section I by tying print film
processing (the tied product) to both slide print film processing and pick up and delivery service
(the tying products). Id. at 724. The court was clearly mistaken.
Assuming that it makes some sense to label Fotomat's simple anticipatory breach of contract
a "tie," that tie would have been illegal only if Fotomat had held appreciable economic power in
the market of the tying products. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S.
610 (1977). "Appreciable economic power" means the power to raise price above and restrict
output below levels that would have prevailed had the market been competitively structured. Id.
at 620. Fotomat had no such power.
The Seventh Circuit argued that Fotomat had such power since Photovest could not obtain
the tying products from anyone else for "free." 606 F.2d at 724. The court's argument borders on
the disingenuous. Obviously, Photovest was not obtaining the tying products for free. It was
paying for them as part of its contractual arrangements with Fotomat. Moreover, the ability to
give products away is hardly evidence of "appreciable economic power." 429 U.S. at 620.
15 1. Photovest also claimed that Fotomat had combined and conspired with its wholly owned
subsidiary, Fotomat Labs, Inc., in violation of section I to eliminate Photovest as a retail competitor and independent purchaser of photo processing. 606 F.2d at 725-26. In addition, Photovest
alleged various transgressions of state laws including a breach of an implied covenant of good
faith, tortious breach of contract, and fraud. Id. at 727-30.
152. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., [1977-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 61, 529 (S.D. Ind.
1977).
153. 606 F.2d at 704. The court unqualifiedly endorsed the trial judge's condemnation of
Fotomat under section 2. Id. at 721.
154. 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977)).
155. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
156. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 72, at 323-25. In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, 334 U.S. 110, 119 (1948), the threat of vigorous penetration in a market was accepted as
evidence of "intent" in a section 2 proceeding. In Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 31 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978), placement of a
plant very near a competitor's was also accepted as evidence of "intent" in a section 2 proceeding.
In neither case was the conduct itself deemed predatory, although the Seventh Circuit cited both
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health to a monopolistically moribund industry. That the entering firm
and the virtual monopolist were franchisor and franchisee made the
conduct no less desirable from the viewpoint of the consuming public.
The Seventh Circuit's decision cannot be squared with the
1 57
Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
which the Seventh Circuit cavalierly dismissed as inapposite. 58 In that
case, the Supreme Court had to determine whether Treadway Companies, Inc., owner of several bowling centers, could recover treble damages for injuries sustained when Brunswick, in violation of section 7 of
the Clayton Act, acquired competing centers which had been about to
go out of business, and kept them open. "At base," observed Justice
Marshall for his unanimous brethren, "[Treadway] complain[s] that by
acquiring the failing centers [Brunswick] preserved competition,
thereby depriving [Treadway] of the benefits of increased concentration. The damages [Treadway] obtained are designed to provide [it]
with the profits [it] would have realized had competition been reduced."' 159 Similarly, Photovest complained that by opening stores,
Fotomat had introduced competition, thereby depriving Photovest of
the benefits of monopoly. The damages Photovest obtained were akin
to those obtained by Treadway. Noting that "[t]he antitrust laws...
were enacted for 'the protection of competition not competitors,'" Marshall held that it would be "inimical to the purposes of those laws to
award damages for the type of injur[ies] claimed" by Treadway.160 Or
by Photovest, we might add.
It is not entirely clear how the Seventh Circuit arrived at its conclusion that Fotomat's vigorous penetration of Photovest's market was
predatory. It certainly did not employ Bork's standard. The court may
have simply applied the same populist notions that it applied in City of
Mishawaka v. American Electric Power Co. Perhaps that is why it expressed such solicitude for Photovest's balance sheet 16 and such dismay that Fotomat's managers anticipated and even desired Photovest's
financial distress. 162 But the moralistic overtones of its opinion indicate
that the court was up to more than that. What really galled the court
in support of its holding. 606 F.2d at 719. Moreover, it is not clear that either survived the
Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
See text accompanying notes 157-60 infra.
157. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
158. 606 F.2d at 719.
159. 429 U.S. at 488.
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. 606 F.2d at 715, 717-18.
162. Id. at 719.
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about Fotomat's vigorous penetration of Photovest's market was what
appeared to it to be the money-grubbing perfidy with which the deeds
were done. Fotomat's managers had represented that it was unlikely
that they would open their own stores. In reliance on that representation, Photovest put its capital at risk and began doing business. And
then, simply because it was economically advantageous to do so, Fotomat's managers broke their word.
I think that what the Seventh Circuit really did was unhitch section 2 from its economic moorings. I think it condemned the opening
of stores because of the rapacious greed which seemed to motivate that
conduct. I think that, for the same reason, it condemned the multiple
breaches of the franchise contract, which were unlawful but irrelevant
to allocative or productive efficiency, and the raising of the rent for
each store site, which was not even unlawful. The court's instincts may
have been commendable, but its jurisprudence was not. Using section
2 to police "business ethics" will likely deter efficiency-generating behavior.163 Using it to punish greed will almost certainly yield particularly perverse results for, although greed may be one of the seven
deadly sins, it is also the fuel that fires the engine of competition.
CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit exposed its lack of a coherent antitrust philosophy by.resolving antitrust disputes on the basis of words and phrases
lifted out of context from leading opinions and applied literally. It is
not surprising, then, that in Chillicothe Sand & Gravel v. Martin Marietta, the court rendered a decision consistent with consumer welfare
goals while in the three other major antitrust cases decided last term it
did not.
Ironically, the court's inconsistency may be evidence of a faint silver lining in an otherwise cloudy jurisprudential sky. It is possible that
the court's inconsistency may reflect the inconsistency of the defendants' appellate briefs. Only in the brief submitted in behalf of Martin
Marietta was the consumer welfare goal of antitrust law articulated and
an integrated economic/legal analysis used to explain why that goal
required a decision favorable to the defendant.164 Perhaps if other law163. See, e.g., Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373, 435, 450 (1974). Lee, Antitrust: A
Collage of Vertical TerritorialRestraints, Tying and Monopoly "Misuse,"Arbitrability,andthe GeneralDynamics Defense, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1979).
164. Brief of Appellee, Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427
(7th Cir. 1980).
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yers follow this lead, the Seventh Circuit may be persuaded to reach
more sensible, or at least more predictable, decisions.

